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1Introduction
When new agricultural technologies are introduced, adoption often does not occur immediately. 
Instead, farmers follow a complex pattern of gradual adoption, dis-adoption and sometimes non-
adoption, resulting in an S-shaped adoption curve when plotting number of adopters against time 
(Besley and Case 1993; Feder et al. 1985; Sunding and Zilberman 2001). While prices, income and 
individuals’ attributes, such as risk aversion, are known determinants of adoption behavior, recent 
contributions in sociology and economics have pointed towards the importance of so-called social 
interaction effects, a general term encompassing both pecuniary and non-pecuniary effects of 
individuals on each other, such as social learning, social pressure and imitation.
Farmers learn about prices of inputs and outputs, use of inputs and expected yields given these inputs 
from own experimentation, the media, input dealers and each others’ experimentation, the latter 
being referred to as social learning (Baird 2003; Bandiera and Rasul 2006; Conley and Udry 2005; 
Foster and Rosenzweig 1995; Moser and Barrett 2006). In addition, a farmer’s choice could be directly 
inﬂuenced by the choices of other farmers through social pressures, ie, deviation from standard 
agricultural practices entails a non-monetary cost, for instance, social exclusion (Appadurai 1989; 
Moser and Barrett 2006; Rogers 1964; Vasavi 1994). Finally, farmers can inﬂuence one another 
through imitation (Bandiera and Rasul 2006; Pomp and Burger 1995; Rogers 1964). In this regard, I 
distinguish behavioral imitation, motivated through a keeping-up-with-the-Joneses attitude, from 
imitation motivated through a learning story. In the latter, a farmer, despite not observing the outcome 
of another farmer’s experimentation, makes inferences about the proﬁtability of the technique if he 
observes another farmer using it.
These studies face three main challenges. First, one needs to separate the social interaction effects 
from the correlated effects, ie, the unobservables which seemingly coordinate the actions of the 
agents through similar constraints, for instance climatic and soil conditions. Second, one needs to 
differentiate between the various social interaction effects. This is not straightforward as these 
interactions will lead to the same reduced form effects in the data: correlated behavior. For instance, 
two farmers might be adopting a crop because they both learned from the same source about its 
proﬁtability, or because one imitates the other, or because only if they coordinate and produce the 
same crop, will a trader ﬁnd it worthwhile to come to the village and pick up the produce. However, 
differentiation along pathways is crucial from a policy perspective. 
The right strategy to stimulate increased and quicker uptake of promising technologies depends 
fundamentally on the structure of technology adoption processes at the farm level; in other words, 
different constraints imply different policy measures. If a lack of information is the constraining 
factor, agricultural extension services might be a ﬁrst best response. But which farmers does one then 
target: the well-educated richer farmers or the less-educated poorer farmers? If social pressures 
appear to impair the adoption of new technologies, giving information to a few selected farmers per 
village will most likely not be a successful strategy in tipping the equilibrium. Third, one needs to ﬁnd 
measures of the social relations of each individual in the sample, a difﬁcult task due to the multi-
dimensionality and sheer multitude of these relationships. 
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2This paper builds on the existing literature. Using the adoption process of Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) 
cotton in rural India as an example, I show how one can distinguish between the inﬂuences of three 
different social interaction processes: social learning, imitation and social pressures. The Bt technology 
was introduced in India in 2002. Studies have shown that adopting this technology can lead to a 
substantial reduction in pesticide use and sizable yield effects where pest damage by bollworms is not 
effectively controlled otherwise (Qaim 2003). In India, in years of severe pest pressure, the net-
revenue density function of Bt cotton First Order Stochastically Dominates (FOSD) its non-Bt 
counterpart (Qaim and Zilberman 2003).
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. The next section gives some background 
information on Bt cotton technology. This is followed by an introduction to the data collected, outline 
of the model and the empirical identiﬁcation strategy. This is followed by a discussion of the results 
and conclusions.
Background
India is one of the largest producers of cotton in the world. In 2008, it produced 5,443 thousand 
metric tons compared to 2,985 thousand metric tons in the USA. The average cotton yield in 2008 
in India was 579 kg/ha versus 951 kg/ha in the USA and 1,325 kg/ha in China (Table 1). However, 
yields in India have increased substantially since the early 90s (Figure 1). The main cotton producing 
states in India are Gujarat, Maharashtra, Punjab and Andhra Pradesh, producing over 80% of the 
cotton in India, with an average yield of 625 kg/ha and 253 kg/ha, 750 kg/ha and 381 kg/ha ginned 
cotton in 2006-071.
Table 1. Basic cotton statistics of China, USA and India.
Country
Cotton production¹ Cotton 
exports¹
2008
Cotton 
yields²
20081985 1990 1995 2000 2008
China 4,137 4,507 4,768 4,420 7,947 16 1,325
USA 2,924 3,376 3,897 3,742 2,985 2,830 951
India 1,964 1,989 2,885 2,380 5,443 1,328 579
1. In thousand metric tons.
2. In kg/ha (ginned) cotton.
Source: United States Department of Agriculture, PSD Online. Updated 10/10/2008.
Main losses in cotton production in India are due to its predominant cultivation under rainfed 
conditions and its susceptibility to 166 species of insects, pests and diseases. Today, around 50% of 
pesticides used in India are used on cotton (ISAAA 2005). The major pests affecting cotton are 
jassids, aphids, white ﬂy and bollworms. The cotton bollworm complex comprises of the American 
bollworm (Helicoverpa armigera), pink bollworm (Pectinophora gossypiella), spiny bollworm (Earias 
insulana) and spotted bollworm (Earias vittella) (ISAAA 2005, Asia-Paciﬁc Consortium of Agricultural 
Biotechnology 2006).
As a response to bollworm pest problems, Monsanto developed the Bt GM (Genetically Modiﬁed) 
technology during the 1980s. In collaboration with the Maharashtra Hybrid Seed Company (Mahyco), 
the technology was introduced into several of Mahyco’s hybrid breeding lines during the 1990s. In 
2002, the Genetic Engineering Approval Committee (GEAC), India, approved the commercial 
1.  Source: INDIASTAT. Selected state-wise estimated yield of cotton in India in 2006-07. Note the all-India average is 421 kg/ha.
3release of three Bt cotton cultivars of Mahyco. As of August 2008, 225 cotton cultivars with one of 
the Bt constructs have been approved by GEAC. These Bt cultivars contain a gene (cry gene) sourced 
from the soil bacterium Bacillus thuringiensis in their DNA sequence2.
This gene produces a protein that is toxic to several insects of the Lepidoptera order; amongst others, 
the American bollworm, the spiny bollworm, the spotted bollworm and to a lesser extent, the pink 
bollworm. The Bt gene does not effectively control against all bollworms and provides no protection 
against other pests and diseases. Also, when a Bt gene is inserted in the DNA of a plant, it only affects 
its pest resistance. It does not affect its duration, drought resistance, ﬁber length, expected yield, etc. 
These properties are determined by the cultivar in which the gene was inserted. The effect on pesticide 
use, yield and hence proﬁts from switching from any non-Bt to any Bt cultivar can therefore be 
decomposed into two effects: the Bt effect and the germplasm effect.
Data from trials on Bt cotton and its isogenic non-Bt counterpart show that in high bollworm pressure 
years, the Bt net-revenue density function FOSD the non-Bt function3.
If the bollworm pressure is low (and hence few pesticides need to be used) and the price of the Bt 
seed is high, this result might not hold. Pemsla et al. (2004), using farm data of non-isogenic Bt and 
non-Bt cultivars in Karnataka during 2002-03, conclude that the proﬁtability density function of non-
Bt FOSD the Bt function.
Data
The three villages selected for this study are part of the Village Level Studies (VLS) program of the 
International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT). In this program, 
ICRISAT followed up 300 randomly selected households from six villages between 1975 and 1985 
2. This protein, when entering the gut of the insect in the larvae phase, meets a receptor protein, it binds with it and punctures the wall 
of the intestine, which leads to paralysis and eventually death of the insect. This receptor protein is only found in insects of the Lepi-
doptera order.
3. Data from Qaim and Zilberman (2003) from trials done in 2001-02, a high bollworm pressure year. I am grateful to Matim Qaim for 
sharing the dataset with me.
Figure 1. Evolution of cotton yield in China, India and USA.
Source: INDIASTAT.
4on a three-weekly basis. This dataset, known as the ﬁrst generation VLS, contains detailed household 
(income, wealth, consumption and labor) and plot level (input/output) data4.
In 2001, ICRISAT restarted the panel, revisiting 185 of the ﬁrst generation VLS households and their 
split-offs, in addition to 261 newly added households, to make the sample representative for each 
village in terms of land-holding size5.
Between August 2007 and November 2008, I collected an additional round of data in three out of six 
villages: Aurepalle in Mahbubnagar district in Andhra Pradesh and Kanzara and Kinkheda in Akola 
district in Maharashtra. I covered 246 VLS farmers, 20 progressive farmers6 and 3 village leaders using 
a combination of experiments and questionnaires, including quantitative and qualitative, objective 
and subjective, and closed and open-ended questions.
Among the VLS farmers, I conducted a household questionnaire and plot-level questionnaires for 
each plot. Among the progressive farmers, I carried out a progressive farmer questionnaire, containing 
a larger recall section than the household questionnaire. Finally, I completed a village questionnaire, 
including information on climate and village infrastructure, with the assistance of the village pradhan, 
three knowledgeable people in each village, the Mandal/Tehsil Revenue Ofﬁce7 and the District 
Collector’s ofﬁce. 
The household questionnaire includes sections on household composition, landholding (including soil 
characteristics), agricultural machinery and income, and a recall section on cotton adoption, production 
and marketing8. It also contains a section on self-perception regarding risk-aversion, time-preferences 
and ability, perceived health and environmental hazards associated with Bt cotton and social networks. 
In addition, I elicited risk aversion beliefs regarding yield distribution and social networks within the 
village using an experimental set-up. The risk game, based on Lybbert and Just (2007), consists of 
four hypothetical farming seasons, eliciting the farmer’s maximum willingness to pay for a bag of 
cotton seed that gives a particular yield distribution. The results of this game provide a proxy for risk 
aversion. The yield distribution game, based on Lybbert et al. (2007), asks the farmer to construct 
four yield density functions of two Bt cultivars and two non-Bt cultivars of their choice conditional 
on the plot characteristics of their own plots9. The plot-level questionnaire includes questions on 
agricultural inputs used per plot and outputs produced, including prices.
Social networks were measured in three different ways. The ﬁrst was to ask the farmer how many 
farmers he knew in each year since 2001-02 in different social groups (total, village, relatives) that 
adopted Bt cotton in that year and what the experience of these farmers was with Bt cotton. This 
method has the advantage of capturing all information links of the farmer, but, as we know little about 
these contacts, it provides little information on the nature of these links. 
4. For an overview of the goals, methods and outcomes of the ﬁrst generation VLS, see Singh et al. (1985) and Walker and Ryan 
(1990).
5. For an overview of the goals, methods and outcomes of the second generation VLS up to 2005, see Bantilan et al. (2006) and Rao and 
Charyulu (2007).
6. I identiﬁed these “progressive farmers” in collaboration with village leaders and VLS investigators who have been living in the village 
since 2001.
7. Mandal refers to the third-level administrative area in Andhra Pradesh, below state and district. The equivalent in other states is tehsil 
(or taluka).
8. This section overlaps with the data collected in the 2001-07 ICRISAT VLS.
9. More speciﬁcally, we ﬁrst elicited the minimum and maximum and then used 20 stones to form a conditional yield distribution. During 
the interview, we explicitly linked the number of stones to percentages. See also Delavande et al. (2008) for the various methods that 
can be used. 
5The second method was a random matching within the sample experiment based on Conley and Udry 
(2005) and Santos and Barrett (2007). Through this method, I elicited the characteristics of the 
relationship between two randomly drawn respondents, both members of the VLS sample. Each VLS 
respondent was matched up with six randomly drawn VLS respondents and four ﬁxed progressive 
farmers. The questions included: how long have you known person X?, how frequently do you talk to 
person X?, how risk averse are you compared to person X?, how proﬁtable are you on your farm 
compared to person X?, and a set of questions on the knowledge of X’s farming activities in terms of 
inputs and outputs. As we know the characteristics of person X drawn, this method can shed more 
light on the nature of learning and imitation, but might incorrectly represent the population of 
information contacts of the respondent. 
Third, the respondents were asked who they would go to for information if they had problems with 
their cotton crop, including some characteristics of person X’s farming activities and the relationship 
between the respondent and person X. This method provides a proxy of all the strong information 
links of the respondent. To control for information from institutional sources, a section on the 
information obtained since 2001-02 from contacts with extension agents, NGOs, input dealers and 
ICRISAT was included.
The questionnaire included one direct question regarding social pressures (“when you adopted Bt 
cotton, did you experience any resistance from fellow farmers, relatives or others?”). One plausible 
explanation underlying social pressures with regard to Bt cotton is the (incorrectly) perceived negative 
externalities of the technique on other farmers’ crops and livestock. As such, data on the farmer’s 
views and the perceived views of different social groups of the effects of Bt cotton on animal health, 
human health and the environment were collected.
These data were added to six rounds of the ICRISAT-VLS data (2001-07) containing household 
composition, landholding, per-plot agricultural input used and output produced, machinery, income 
and wealth data, to form a quasi-panel dataset encompassing seven cropping years, from 2001-02 to 
2007-08. A word on sample attrition (Appendix A). Of the 199 households covered in 2001-02 by 
the VLS, 92% were still in sample in 2007-08. It is these 184 households plus some of their split-offs 
and newly added households, a total of 246 households that I interviewed. Of these, 71% had data 
for all seven cropping years. Of the 29% of the households who are included in the sample from a 
later date, 30% were households that had split-off from the sample households during 2001-08. 
These split-off households are included from their date of split-off.
Table 2 gives selected descriptive statistics of the three villages. Aurepalle, with 925 households, is 
the largest village of the three. It is situated in the drought-prone Telangana region of Andhra Pradesh. 
The soils in this region, alﬁsols, are generally sufﬁcient for good crop production, but as they are acidic 
in nature, require fertilizers and are prone to erosion. Kanzara and Kinkheda, with 319 and 189 
households respectively, are located in the somewhat less drought-prone Akola district of West 
Maharashtra. The soils in this region, vertisols, with their high clay content and poor physical condition 
are very susceptible to erosion, but as their chemical properties are excellent, can give high yields if 
properly managed. The average education level of the respondent (ie, the main decision-maker with 
regard to agriculture) is low, especially in Aurepalle (2.31 years). The average size of a household is 
between 4 and 5 members in all three villages.
Table 3 summarizes the main cotton-related statistics. In Aurepalle, Kanzara and Kinkheda, 60%, 86% 
and 82% respectively of the sampled households have farmed cotton in (any of) the last seven years. 
Of these, 76%, 48% and 11% respectively have adopted Bt cotton at any point in time in the last seven 
6years. Dis-adoption rates are low. In Kinkheda, there was no dis-adoption. In Aurepalle, only 2% of 
the cotton farmers dis-adopted in 2005-06. In Kanzara, between 2% to 7% of the cotton farmers dis-
adopted in any given year. The farmers who dis-adopted, except for three of them who stopped 
farming cotton altogether, re-adopted Bt cotton the next year.
Figure 2 plots the number of farmers cultivating Bt cotton as a percentage of the total number of 
cotton farmers (the “adoption” curves). The adoption process was markedly different in the three 
villages. While Kanzara displayed a smooth adoption process, Aurepalle showed a sudden jump in 
2005 and Kinkheda a reluctant take-off in the same year. In Andhra Pradesh, two out of three Mahyco 
cultivars were not approved by GEAC during 2002-03 and 2003-0410. This might be one of the causes 
of the delayed adoption in Aurepalle. The current adoption rate in Aurepalle, Kanzara and Kinkheda 
stand at 98%, 50% and 14% respectively.
Turning to current knowledge about Bt cotton in Table 3 in Aurepalle, Kanzara and Kinkheda, 23%, 
5% and 0% respectively of the respondents had never heard of Bt cotton at the time of the interview 
in 2008. This ﬁgure is much lower among cotton farmers, 4%, 0% and 0%, respectively. Assuming a 
step-wise distribution with the minimum and maximum of the distribution as speciﬁed by the 
10. See http//www.envfor.nic.in/divisions/csurv/geac/biosafety.html
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of Aurepalle, Kanzara and Kinkheda villages.
Aurepalle Kanzara Kinkheda
Number of households in village 925 319 189
Number of households in sample 128 63 55
Soils¹ Alﬁsols Vertisols Vertisols
Average rainfall (mm/year)² 542 1140 1052
Distance to nearest town (km)³ 10; 12 9 12
Phone service in the village (year of establishment)³ 1978; 2003 2002 1993
Average education level of respondent (in years) 2.31 6.61 6.89
Average number of household members 4.23 4.87 4.5
Average yearly income (Rs)4 43,543 53,720 38,087
1. Source: Walker and Ryan (1990) using the USDA soil taxonomy system.
2. In 2005-07.
3. The two ﬁgures for Aurepalle refer to the main village of Aurepalle and the sub-village of Nallavaripalli.
4. In 2004-05.
Table 3. Basic cotton related descriptive statistics. 
Aurepalle Kanzara Kinkheda
Households that farm cotton (%)¹ 60 86 82
Cotton farmers that have adopted Bt cotton (%)¹ 76 48 11
Cotton farmers that have never heard of Bt cotton (%) 4 0 0
Average perceived mean of Bt cotton distribution (Q/acre)2 7.60 6.82 5.45
Average perceived mean of non-Bt cotton distribution (Q/acre)2 4.79 3.88 3.72
Average number of farmers known to cultivate Bt cotton3 85 38 34
Respondents with safety concerns regarding Bt cotton (%) 13 51 53
1. In 2001-08.
2. In 2007-08, 1 quintal = 100 kg.
3. In 2007-08.
7respondent, I calculated the mean of the perceived conditional yield distribution of Bt cotton and 
non-Bt cotton for each respondent. These reﬂect the current beliefs about Bt cotton and non-Bt 
cotton for each respondent. One can see that, on average, the mean yield is perceived to be higher for 
Bt cotton versus non-Bt cotton. This difference is smaller in Kinkheda compared to Kanzara and 
Aurepalle. In 2007-08, the respondents in Aurepalle, Kanzara and Kinkheda, on average, knew 85, 38 
and 34 farmers respectively who cultivated Bt cotton in 2007-0811.
Concerns about health and environmental implications of this new technology might be one of the 
factors driving social pressures. In Aurepalle, Kanzara and Kinkheda, 13%, 51% and 53% respectively 
of the respondents “agreed” or “strongly agreed” with (at least) one of the following statements: “Bt 
cotton is hazardous for animal health: they might get sick or die when they eat it”, “Bt cotton is 
hazardous for human health: if you touch it too much, you might get sick” and “Bt cotton is hazardous 
for the environment: it damages crops and soils”.
Regarding the structure of information networks, Table 4 presents some selected statistics. In 
Aurepalle, Kanzara and Kinkheda, on average, 78%, 85% and 57% respectively of the Bt farmers 
known to the respondent lived in the village. The next ﬁve rows present the results from the random 
matching within sample game. Recall that each respondent draws 6 name cards of VLS respondents 
and is given a set of 4 ﬁxed cards with names of progressive farmers. Denote the individual on the 
card by x. The next column indicates the number of times that the respondent knew x as a percentage 
of all the cards drawn. One can see that in a small village like Kinkheda, literally everyone knows 
everyone else. The next column gives, conditional on knowing x, the number of times that the 
respondent thought (for sure) that x was a farmer, again as a percentage. Similarly, the following 
column indicates, conditional on x thought to be a farmer, the number of times that the respondent 
thought (for sure) that x was a cotton farmer. The last column gives, conditional on x thought to be 
a cotton farmer, the number of times the respondent knew both whether x was cultivating Bt versus 
11. In case of a range given by the respondent, the average was taken. If the respondent answered “don’t know”, it was assumed they knew 
no Bt cotton farmers. Note that a “don’t know” can be interpreted in two ways: (1) I do not remember how many farmers I knew that 
year that adopted Bt cotton, or (2) in that year, I did not know how many farmers adopted Bt cotton. From my conversations on the 
ﬁeld, it appears that the second interpretation was far more common.
Figure 2. Number of farmers adopting Bt cotton.
8non-Bt cotton and the yield obtained by x. Once again, in Kinkheda, farmers not only knew each other 
by name, but also by cultivar and yield.
Model
This section outlines a simple 2-period agricultural household model. The notations used in this 
model are outlined in Appendix B. Consider a representative farmer, denoted with subscript i. 
Subscript i is implied unless otherwise noted. Time is indexed by subscripts t∈{1,2}. Subscripts b 
and n, respectively, refer to Bt cotton and non-Bt cotton. The farmer possesses land, denoted A, 
assumed to be ﬁxed over time. The farmer’s per-period well-being u is a function of the farmer’s 
consumption, denoted by c, and a non-material satisfaction term, denoted by s. I assume that this 
utility function takes the following shape:
ttt scu −≡ ln (1)
The satisfaction term is included to capture social pressures and (behavioral) imitation effects and is 
deﬁned as in 2 and 3 with Ab,t, At, APF,t denoting, respectively, farmer i’s acreage under Bt cotton, the 
village average acreage under Bt cotton and a progressive farmer’s, denoted PF, acreage under Bt 
cotton at time t. I denotes an indicator function taking the value of 1 if Ab,t>0 and zero otherwise.
( )[        ] [ ]21,1,  2011,1 1, P  FbAbi AA IAAs b −+−≡ > (2)
( )[ ] [ ] ( )[ ]2011,22,2,2022,2 1,2, >> −+−+−≡ bb AbPFbAbi IAAAAIAAs θ (3)
The ﬁrst terms in 2 and 3 represent social pressure and the second term captures (behavioral) imitation 
effects. Note that social pressures can have lingering effects in the next period, as captured in the 
third term by θ. 
Turning to the production side of the model, recall that the effect of pesticide depends on bollworm 
pressure. Denote bollworm pressure by q∈{ }HL qq , , referring to high and low pressure respectively. 
The perceived probability of a high bollworm pressure year is Q and the farmer makes his decision 
regarding pesticide use in the middle of each period, ie, after q is revealed. Denote prices of cotton, 
pesticides and seed, respectively, by p, px and ps pesticides by x and unexpected shocks caused by 
weather ﬂuctuations as ε, an i.i.d mean 1 random variable. Now, farm proﬁts are deﬁned as 
follows:12
12.  For reasons of tractability I opt for a CRS Cobb-Douglas function.
Table 4. Structure of information networks in Aurepalle, Kanzara and Kinkheda villages.
Aurepalle Kanzara Kinkheda
Bt farmers known to live in the village (%) 78 85  57
Known x? 88 99 100
Does x farm? 82 84  92
Does x farm cotton? 57 70  90
Is there a “link”? 29 42  63
9( ) [ ]
)()(
)()(),(),(
,,,,,,
,
)(1
,
)(
,,
)(1
,
)(
,
tbnstbbstntbx
tn
q
tn
q
tbtb
q
tb
q
tbtttt
AApApxxp
xAAxAqpqq tntntbtb
−−−+−
−+≡ −− εεαεβαπ ββββ
(4)
The object of learning in 4 is α(q) and βb(q)⊂[0,1], the parameters of the Bt cotton production function. 
Denote the prior beliefs on these as F0(∝(q), βb(q)). 
Note that βn(q)⊂[0,1] is assumed to be known by the farmer. Beliefs are updated at the beginning at 
each period, before decisions regarding acreage are made, using the following rule, where Ni denotes 
all the members of farmer i’s network:
( ) ⎥⎦
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∈∀ ∈∀
− >−−>
i i
tbjtitbj
Nj Nj
AAAbtbt IIIFLqqF 01,,1,0,, ,,)),(),())(),(( 1 βαβα (5)
Recognizing the abuse of notation in 5 with regard to the indicator function I, the second term refers 
to indirect learning by observing the current behavior of one’s contacts, the third to the information 
gathered through own experimentation and the last to information gathered from the farmer’s 
contacts’ experimentation.
At the beginning of period 1, the farmer will decide on Ab,1 taking into account the expected use of 
pesticides and the effect of the choice of Ab,1 on future beliefs. pressurealizing the price of the 
consumption good to 1 and excluding all other forms of income, ie, )(⋅≤ ttc π  the farmer solves the 
following decision problem at the beginning of period 1, where δ denotes the discount factor:
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where E1 is the expectation with regard to Q, α(q), βb(q), ε, A1, APF,1 and {Aj,1}∀j∈Ni. I abstract from 
the belief formation process with regard to A1, APF,1 and {Aj,1}∀j∈Ni and do not impose correct 
expectations in this regard. Denote the optimal solution of 6 with Ab,1*. Note that conditional on 
0<Ab,1<A and xb,1>0, a change in Ab,1 or xb,1, everything else equal, will not result in a change in the 
expected change of beliefs. The demand for pesticides, xb,1(q,Ab,1)>0 (and similarly xn,1(q,Ab,1)>0) is 
derived from 6,with Yb,1 the production of Bt cotton:
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Note that if the various random variables are independent, one can derive the demand for pesticides 
conditional on bollworm pressure and acreage under Bt cotton:
13.  Note that if 0<Ab,1**<A then xb,1**>0 and xn,1**>0.
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The First Order Condition of 6 deﬁnes the candidate (interior) optimal solution Ab,1**:
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where xb,1=xb,1(q,Ab,1) and xn,1=xn,1(q,Ab,1). Denote xb,1**=xb,1(q,Ab,1**) and xn,1** = xn,1(q,Ab,1**). The 
derivative of Ab,1** with respect to Q, the perceived probability of a high bollworm pressure year, is: 
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If Bt cotton in a low bollworm pressure year has little effect but Bt cotton increases the marginal 
productivity of pesticides in a high bollworm pressure year (and the latter effect is not offset by a 
lower marginal productivity of land of Bt cotton), the effect of an increase in Q is positive. The 
derivative with respect to 11 AE  and E1APF,1 are respectively:
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Equations 11 and 12, respectively, show how changes in social pressures and (behavioral) imitation 
effect optimal land allocation. An increase in the village average acreage under Bt cotton will increase 
the optimal acreage under Bt cotton. Similarly, an increase in the progressive farmer’s acreage under 
Bt cotton will increase the optimal acreage under Bt cotton.
11
The derivative of Ab,1** with respect to E1α(q) and E1βb,1(q) are (assuming independence among the 
various random variables):
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Note that 13 is strictly positive, ie, if the expected value of the technology parameter of the Bt cotton 
production function increases, the acreage under Bt cotton increases as well. The sign of equation 14 
is ambiguous and will depend on the sign of [lnAb,1**–lnxb,1**]. Note that a change in Aj,1 can result 
in a change in beliefs at the time t regarding the parameters of the Bt cotton production function 
following 5.
To conclude this section, note that at Ab,1=0, the objective function of 6 is discontinuous. At that 
point the own experimentation term in 5 is zero and the social pressure term in s1(⋅) drops out, 
boosting utility upwards. Thus, in order to determine the optimal choice of Ab,1, denoted Ab,1*, one 
needs to compare the expected discounted utility at Ab,1** as deﬁned by 9 and the expected discounted 
utility in case of non-adoption as deﬁned by:
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Note that as one shifts from Ab,1=0 to a small, but positive Ab,1, one affects 5. For simplicity’s sake, 
imagine that the farmer updates his beliefs in a (Gaussian) Bayesian fashion (Chamley 2004). In this 
case, even though one cannot predict the change in expected value of α(q) and βb(q), one can show 
that, no matter the outcome of the experiment, the variance on α(q) and βb(q) will go down. Any 
risk-averse decision-maker should therefore ex-ante attribute a higher expected utility to a decision 
problem in which one has access to the information of one experiment more, everything else equal. 
But this also implies that this positive effect of experimentation can be dampened by expected 
information coming from the experimentation of other farmers. As such, one can expect some degree 
of free-riding on others’ experimentation.
Empirical strategy
Following the model outlined above, the reduced form function for Ab,1** is:
[ ]εββαθδ FqqqFAEAEppppAAA nbPFnsbsxb ),()),(),((,,,,,,,,, 11,111,,1, = (16)
The data concerning the 2008-09 cropping year provide planned acreage under Bt and non-Bt cotton 
(Ab,1,A), information on time preferences (δ), current beliefs regarding the performance of Bt and 
12
non-Bt cotton (F1(α(q),βb(q)), βn(q) unconditional on q and ε but conditional on land quality and the 
number of insecticide sprays thought to be needed) and expected prices of Bt cotton and non-Bt 
cotton seeds (ps,b and ps,n). I assume that the social norm effect (θ) and the prices that farmers face in 
terms of cotton and pesticides are well-known village-level variables. Note that the theoretical model 
assumes no individual differences in the speciﬁcation of the utility function 1 and the satisfaction 
function 2. In addition, the theory model ignored differences in soil quality, wealth and non-cotton 
related income sources. In practice, it will be useful to control for these variables as they might be 
driving spurious correlation. In the ﬁrst speciﬁcation 17, I assume that all individuals have the same 
beliefs regarding 11 AE  and E1APF,1. Note that in this case, one is unable to distinguish the social 
pressure, (behavioral) imitation and village-level free-riding effects from the other village-level 
effects. 
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where M denotes mean, V denotes variance, SP denotes number of (insecticide) sprays needed per 
season, VILL denotes a village-speciﬁc ﬁxed effect and Xij denotes the individual level controls, ie, 
land, Bt/non-Bt cotton seed prices, land, (self-perceived) time preferences and (self-perceived) risk 
aversion. In the second speciﬁcation 18, I control for social pressures using the perceived safety 
concerns regarding Bt cotton of other village farmers. The variable “SAFE” is constructed as the 
average of the answers to: “To what degree do you think that other village farmers think that Bt cotton 
is hazardous for (1) animal health, (2) for human health, (3) for the environment?”.
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The third speciﬁcation 19 adds the variable “NUMBER”, ie, the number of villagers that the farmers 
believe will plant Bt cotton in June 2008. This variable, arguably, captures the combined social 
pressure from non-safety origins, (behavioral) imitation and free rider effects. Note that this 
speciﬁcation controls for social pressures originating from safety concerns.
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The fourth and ﬁnal speciﬁcation 20 uses data from the random matching within sample game and 
adds the percentage of progressive farmers that cultivate Bt cotton as a percentage of all progressive 
farmers as perceived by the respondent, denoted by “PF”. This variable captures (behavioral) imitation 
and free rider effects.
13
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The quasi-panel data covering 2001-02 up to 2007-08 do not provide information on beliefs. Adapting 
5 to a panel data context:
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Assuming that all respondents start with the same prior beliefs, one can study beliefs formation 
through the following speciﬁcation:
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where Xi,j,t stands for individual level effect such as education and age and VILLi,j,t can include either 
village ﬁxed effects or a measure of village-level information ﬂow into the village through extension 
agents, etc.
The reduced form functions for Ab,t** and xb,t** following the theory model outlined in the previous 
section are:
[ ]εββαθδ FqqqFAEAEppppAAA nbttPFttttnstbstxtttb ),()),(),((,,,,,,,,, ,,,,,,, = (23)
[ ]εββαθδ FqqqFAEAEppppAAx nbttPFttttnstbstxtttb ),()),(),((,,,,,,,,, ,,,,,,, = (24)
If we would have information on Fi,t(⋅), this would suggest the following speciﬁcation for Ab,i,j,t/Ai,j,t:
Ab,i,j,t /Ai,j,t =  γ17.pj,t + γ18.δi + γ19.RISKi + γ20.Ei,t At 
+γ21.Ei,t APF,t + γ22.Fi,t(α(q), β(q)) 
+γ23.VILLj + ci + μijt 
(25)
where RISKi is the subjective measure of risk aversion, VILLi,j is a village ﬁxed effect capturing the 
inﬂuence of βn(q) and θ and ci is an unobservable individual ﬁxed effect representing the effect of 
Q and Fε. As I do not have information on past beliefs, I will use 21 to guide the speciﬁcation of this 
term. First focus on the last two terms of 21. Essentially, one needs to answers two questions. First, 
which other farmers j does one select? Second, how does one map (Yj,b,t,Aj,b,t,xj,b,t) onto Fi,t(⋅)? Note 
that the latter involves the question of aggregation across experiences of different farmers.
Ideally, following the theoretical model, one would like to include all the information contacts of each 
farmer. This is exactly what the ﬁrst social network question does, asking the number of farmers 
farmer i knew in each year since 2001-02 that adopted Bt cotton. Assuming a linear mapping, one can 
replace the last term in 21 with:
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14
Admitting, this linear mapping is a rather crude method of capturing the increase in knowledge from 
one’s own and others’ experiences. Ideally, one would like to take into account certain aspects of j’s 
production (input and output) and the relationship between farmer i and his contact j.14
As such, one needs to think about sampling the set of contacts of each farmer. Two of the most 
popular techniques are respondent-driven snowball sampling15 and taking the “network of a sample”. 
The ﬁrst technique is useful when one is interested in properties of the network itself, but as it results 
in a non-representative sample of the households, it is not a useful technique for the economic 
analysis of the effects of social networks on something else (Scott 1991). The second technique, 
taking the “network of a sample”, artiﬁcially truncates the network, and is not representative for the 
“network of the population” and as such will result in biased estimates of the micro-economic behavior 
(Santos and Barrett 2007). The reason behind this bias is a positive covariance between the behavior 
of the contacts sampled and the behavior of the contacts that aren’t sampled and as such are part of 
the error term. As such, I propose to use a third method, the random matching within sample method. 
Depending on the structure of underlying network, this method has the potential to provide unbiased 
estimates of the social learning effects. Note that in both “network of a sample” and “random matching 
within sample” one needs to control for information coming from outside of the village as this might 
create spurious correlation. The advantage of using this method is that one can take certain aspects of 
j’s production and the relationship between i and j into account. In case of it, it is the knowledge about 
the proﬁtability of Bt cotton that will drive the binary adoption decision, or:
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where INF denotes a measure of the information coming from outside of the village. And “j linked to 
i” referring to “respondent i draws or is given the card of j in the random matching within sample 
game, knows j, thinks that j is a cotton farmer and knows whether j cultivates Bt cotton and the yield 
of j”. 
With regard to the social pressure and (behavioral) imitation term, the (preliminary) analysis assume 
correct expectations, ie, 
∑=
=
==
4
1
,,,,, )4/1(,
ji
j
tjPFtPFtittti AAEAAE (28)
where in 28 I consider only the four most inﬂuential progressive farmers.
Results
Before discussing the results of the 2008-09 cropping year analysis following speciﬁcations 17, 18, 19 
and 20, one remark is in order. The dependent variables of this analysis relate to the future plans of 
the respondent regarding Bt and non-Bt cotton cultivation. About 130 respondents mentioned 
however that they were not planning (or did not yet know their plans) to grow cotton at all in June 
14. Due to time constraints, one cannot ask the farmer for information regarding their peer’s behavior for all peers. In addition, farmers 
often incorrectly report their peer’s behavior. This might or might not be a problem depending on what drives the farmer’s action: the 
actual behavior of j or the perceived behavior of j (Hogset and Barrett 2008).
15. This is a technique where existing study subjects recruit future subjects from among their acquaintances. Thus the sample group 
appears to grow like a rolling snowball.
15
2008. This issue also relates to the issue of landlessness in the sample. With imperfect land, credit or 
food crop markets, households who would wish to grow Bt cotton, and who happen to have little or 
no land, might end up not growing any cash crops at all. About 75% of the respondents claimed that 
they made their cropping pattern decision ﬁrst and then, conditional on these, tried to lease (rent) 
land in/out (rather than the other way around).
In practice, the results of a probit analysis (using a dummy variable taking the value of one, if the 
respondent plans to grow Bt cotton next year and zero, if the respondent plans to grow non-Bt cotton 
or no cotton at all) including all Kanzara and Kinkheda households16 , following speciﬁcations 17, 18, 
19 and 20 indicate that the acreage of owned land is the only variable that was signiﬁcantly different 
from zero at the 1% level (109 observations, results not shown).
Including Aurepalle in the analysis changed the results (241 observations, results not shown). In 17, 
the variables owned land (1%), M-Bt (5%), SP-Bt (1%), and SP-nonBt (1%) are all signiﬁcant with 
the expected sign. In addition, the three village-level ﬁxed effects are signiﬁcant as well (Aurepalle at 
1%, Kanzara and Kinkheda at 5%). Following speciﬁcation 18, the SAFE variable is signiﬁcant and 
with the expected sign at the 5% level. The other variables mentioned remain signiﬁcant with the 
expected sign, apart from the Kanzara and Kinkheda ﬁxed effects which lose their signiﬁcance. 
Including the number of Bt cotton farmers known in addition to the SAFE variable in 19 does not 
change the results much, the variable NUMBER is not signiﬁcant and the Aurepalle ﬁxed effects loses 
its signiﬁcance. Similarly, adding the progressive farmers’ variable PF as in 20 does not change the 
results much. The PF variable is not signiﬁcant, and the Aurepalle ﬁxed effect again gains its signiﬁcance 
at the 10% level.
As in Aurepalle, all respondents who had decided to include cotton in their cropping pattern for the 
year 2008-09 opted for Bt cotton. This difference in results is entirely driven by inter-village 
differences. The strong signiﬁcance of the variables concerning the production function of Bt cotton 
point towards the importance of knowledge. The signiﬁcance of the SAFE variable illustrates the 
importance of social pressures. While the lack of signiﬁcance of the NUMBER and PF variables might 
be interpreted as a lack of (behavioral) imitation, this result might also indicate a problem in the 
selection of the set of progressive farmers in case of PF.
Table 5 presents the results of the 2008-09 cropping year analysis (OLS) following speciﬁcations 17, 
18, 19 and 20 using planned acreage under Bt cotton as a percentage of planned total area under 
cotton as dependent variable and including only the households that were planning to cultivate cotton 
during 2008-09 (all villages). The results indicate that the perceived mean of the Bt cotton distribution 
and price of seed matters consistently over the different speciﬁcations, but not a lot. The SAFE 
variable is (almost) signiﬁcant at the 10% level in speciﬁcations 18 and 19. The small but negative and 
signiﬁcant NUMBER indicates that the free rider effect dominates the (behavioral) imitation effect. 
The large size of the village ﬁxed effects indicates that the majority of the variation is between the 
villages and not captured by the social pressure and imitation variables. This difference cannot be 
justiﬁed by a difference in the price of cotton (the average price of cotton was Rs 19.54/kg, Rs 22.49/
kg and Rs 21.9/kg in Aurepalle, Kanzara and Kinkheda respectively in 2007-08).
Excluding Aurepalle from the analysis (42 observations, results not shown) results in highly unstable 
parameter estimates. Even after stripping down the model, excluding seed prices that never appear 
signiﬁcant, only the following variables appear to inﬂuence the percentage Bt decision signiﬁcantly 
16. Except for the households whose respondent answered “don’t know” with regard to their future plans. I did not include the variables 
with regard to time preferences and land quality in the probit regression.
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Table 5. Planned Bt area as a percentage of total area (114 observations).
Spec 1 Spec 2 Spec 3 Spec 4
M-Bt 0.0500426*** 0.061668*** 0.0548215** 0.0707883***
M-nonBt 0.0061037 0.011781 0.0127545 0.0130178
V-Bt -0.0178089 -0.0292495 -0.0252347 -0.0385381
V-nonBt -0.0079551 -0.0401024 -0.0454785 -0.0437612
SP-Bt 0.0061186 0.0074114 0.0063498 0.000339
SP-nonBt -0.0164662 -0.0166113 -0.0209205 -0.0144807
Btseedprice -0.0002382*** -0.0002107** -0.0001423 -0.0001951**
Nonbtseedprice 0.0004518*** 0.0003795** 0.0003096** 0.000389**
Subjrisk 0.0436611 0.0356425 0.0333313 0.0490675
Dummyaur 0.5577296*** 0.625275*** 0.6746508*** 0.6210452***
Dummykanz 0.280399 0.4833304* 0.5626444** 0.6071597**
Dummykink 0.1223878 0.3448538 0.3516863 0.3967136*
SAFE -0.0769671 -0.0748849 -0.0811434*
NUMBER -0.0000548**
PF -0.2110548
*** signiﬁcant at 1% level.
** signiﬁcant at 5% level.
* signiﬁcant at 10% level.
across speciﬁcations: M-Bt, V-Bt, subjrisk and NUMBER. The sizes of the corresponding coefﬁcients 
are however much larger compared to the ones presented in Table 6, with the M-Bt coefﬁcient 
around 20 percentage points, the V-Bt coefﬁcient around -17 percentage points and the subjrisk 
coefﬁcient around 14 percentage points. The SAFE variable is not signiﬁcant, but its coefﬁcient is 
large and negative in all speciﬁcations concerned, around 15 percentage points. The NUMBER variable 
is signiﬁcant at the 10% level but its effect negative but small, once again pointing towards a free rider 
effect.
None of the control variables for land quality (value per acre or perceived land quality) and time 
preferences are signiﬁcant in these analyses. As such, I opt to exclude them from the ﬁnal analyses.
Table 6 presents the (preliminary) results of the probit regressions using 26 to deﬁne the learning 
term and a second order term for both learning and social pressure17. As the experience term perfectly 
predicts adoption, ie, once one adopts Bt cotton, one does not dis-adopt, this variable was omitted. 
Any interaction term of the learning variable with the average experience of the other farmers is 
insigniﬁcant (results not reported)18.
The ﬁrst two columns present the results of the regression without a year*aurepalle interaction terms. 
The second two columns add aurepalle*year ﬁxed effects to the analysis. Both the probit coefﬁcient 
and the marginal effects at the average are presented.
17. These regressions were taken in December on data that was only partially validated. So the results should be taken with a pinch of 
salt.
18. Note that including an interaction term using an ordinal variable measuring experience of a group of other farmers (“very positive” up 
to “very negative”) poses an aggregation problem across years. I included only last year’s experience interacted with ﬁve experience 
dummies.
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Note that having one acre of land (ie, cultivable land) and one additional able, adult household 
member increases the probability of adoption signiﬁcantly. The price of cotton is insigniﬁcant, as are 
the female wages. Somewhat surprisingly the price of Bt cotton seed is signiﬁcant only at the 5% level 
in the ﬁrst regression (and has the “wrong” sign) and is not signiﬁcant in the second regression. This 
could be explained by the way this price is measured, ie, as the ofﬁcial price in each state, and as such 
might not always reﬂect the price the farmer is facing. As the VLS has changed the way in which 
income was measured in 2005, and income as such is not comparable across years, I opt not to include 
this variable19. 
The ﬁrst and second order learning terms are signiﬁcant in both regressions at the 1% level. Note that 
the sign of the second order learning term indicates a concave learning effect. The imitation term and 
its square were signiﬁcant in both regressions. Its coefﬁcient is large; one acre/PF more under Bt 
cotton increases the probability of adoption, respectively, 7 percentage points and 11 percentage 
points. In the second regression, the year*aurepalle ﬁxed effects are signiﬁcant and large for 2004 and 
2006. The insigniﬁcance of the risk dummy in both regressions one and two is probably due to the 
rather crude measurement of risk aversion20.
19. Before 2005, income was measured through a direct question to the respondent who was asked to recall his/her income one year back. 
From 2005 onwards, income was measured through a set of modules as the difference between production valued at market prices 
and expenditures valued at market prices including family labor on a three-weekly basis of the different production activities.
20. In the panel data analysis, a farmer is considered risk averse if his willingness to pay for the ﬁrst yield distribution is higher than or 
equal to his willingness to pay for the second yield distribution. Recall that the ﬁrst distribution second-order stochastically dominates 
the second distribution.
Table 6. Panel data analysis - mapping 26 (pooled probit).
N=1074 N=917
Coefﬁcient dF/dx Coefﬁcient dF/d/x
Land 0.059404*** 0.0067928 0.0579811*** 0.0087744
Member 0.1573156*** 0.0179888 0.1625935*** 0.0246056
Pcotton -0.0306528 -0.0035051 0.0071266 0.0010785
Pmale 0.0584956*** 0.0066889 0.0213299 0.0032279
Pfemale -0.0201931 -0.0023091 -0.0538998 -0.008157
Pbtseed 0.0004956** 0.0000567 0.000074 0.0000112
Learning 0.0085215*** 0.0009744 0.0115225*** 0.0017437
Learningsquare -0.0000162*** -1.85E-06 -0.0000201*** -3.04E-06
Pressure -1.187079 -0.1357407 -0.9748837 -1.48E-01
Pressuresquare 0.5442277* 0.0622316 0.2765595 0.0418523
Imitation 0.6230185*** 0.0712413 0.7744032*** 0.1171919
Imitationsquare -0.0468424*** -0.0053564 -0.0474653** -0.007183
Riskdummy -0.0696148 -0.0076748 0.0318526 0.0048856
2004*aur 1.216314* 0.3225766
2005*aur 1.378482 0.3782205
2006*aur 3.077141*** 0.8705021
2007*aur 3.409177 0.9114619
Constant -6.823411 -4.349147
*** signiﬁcant at 1% level.
** signiﬁcant at 5% level.
* signiﬁcant at 10% level.
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Table 7 presents the results of the probit regression, using 27 to deﬁne the learning term and a second 
order for learning, social pressure and imitation, including outside information. Interestingly, the male 
wage was signiﬁcant in the ﬁrst regression. The ﬁrst and second order terms of learning are signiﬁcant 
in both regressions. Knowing both cultivar and yield of one additional farmer in the past increases the 
probability of adoption with 1.2 percentage points and 1.6 percentage points respectively. Knowing 
both cultivar and yield of ten more additional farmers would therefore increase the probability of 
adoption with 12 percentage points and 16 percentage points, respectively. Hearing from one 
additional outside source about Bt cotton increases the probability of adoption by 4 percentage points 
to 6 percentage points. The ﬁrst order pressure term remains insigniﬁcant, but the second order was 
signiﬁcant. The imitation term remains signiﬁcant and relatively large, 6 percentage points to 11 
percentage points. The year*aurepalle interaction dummies are signiﬁcant for three years. 
Table 7. Panel data analysis - mapping 27 (pooled probit).
N=1074 N=917
Coefﬁcient dF/dx Coefﬁcient dF/dx
Land 0.067993*** 0.0069739 0.0714803*** 0.0097137
Member 0.1471257*** 0.0150905 0.1477782*** 0.0200822
Pcotton -0.0209988 -0.0021538 0.0023733 0.0003225
Pmale 0.0716727*** 0.0073514 0.0520862 0.0070782
Pfemale -0.0354244 -0.0036334 -0.056568 -0.007687
Pbtseed 0.0005451** 0.0000559 0.0002835 0.0000385
Learning 0.1097513*** 0.011257 0.1074867*** 0.0146068
Learningsquare -0.0046689** -0.0004789 -0.003843* -0.000522
Outside 0.4196653*** 0.0430444 0.4197865*** 0.0570464
Outsidesquare -0.0905735** -0.00929 -0.0895567** -0.01217
Pressure -1.264985 -0.1297476 -1.162123 -0.157925
Pressuresquare 0.6085618* 0.0624193 0.4427852 0.0601718
Imitation 0.5969088*** 0.061224 0.8576377*** 0.1165477
Imitationsquare -0.0419734*** -0.0043051 -0.054643** -0.007426
Riskdummy 0.0040125 0.0004125 0.0984271 0.0139753
2004*aur 1.497136** 0.4056759
2005*aur 1.788732*** 0.5088275
2006*aur 2.004588* 0.5820978
2007*aur 2.134493 0.626477
Constant -6.735872
*** signiﬁcant at 1% level.
** signiﬁcant at 5% level.
* signiﬁcant at 10% level.
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Conclusion
Preliminary results indicate that social learning matters. The size of the effect depends on how social 
learning is deﬁned and from whom one learns. In this regard, the difference between learning from 
fellow farmers and learning from institutional sources is striking. In the panel data analysis, the social 
pressure effect seems to depend on the inclusion of an imitation term, pointing towards social pressures 
that are mainly driven by the adoption behavior of the progressive farmers. In the cross sectional 
analysis concerning the 2008-09 cropping year, a clear social pressure effect originating from safety 
and environmental concerns with regard to Bt cotton is present. In both panel data analysis and cross 
sectional analysis, the village ﬁxed effects are signiﬁcant and large. In the case of the panel data 
analysis, this might be due to the incorrect measurement of the price of Bt cotton seed in Andhra 
Pradesh.
As this is a working paper in progress, it might be useful to give a brief overview of future work.
First, the measurement of several variables will be improved upon. The prices of Bt cotton seeds 
should reﬂect the prices that farmers are facing in the market each year and a variable income should 
be included in both cases. In addition, the identity of the farmers j and the structure of the social 
learning term can be further investigated. 
Second, the theoretical model as it stands does not contribute much to the analysis. As such, I will 
further expand the empirical identiﬁcation strategy without relying on a speciﬁc structural model. 
The econometric model used should be reﬁned to take into account the “time-effects” of the seemingly 
irreversible adoption decision, using a duration analysis and extended towards the pesticide decision 
using a system-based approach.
Third, several of the underlying assumptions need to be tested explicitly, most importantly with 
regard to the validity of the random matching within sample approach and the correct selection of 
progressive farmers for the imitation component. 
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Appendix A
Number of households included in the sample, by date.
Year Aurepalle Kanzara Kinkheda
From 2001-02 94 52 29
From 2002-03 0 0 0
From 2003-04 5 0 2
From 2004-05 0 0 0
From 2005-06 18 5 22
From 2006-07 11 6 1
From 2007-08 0 0 1
Total sample 128 63 55
Appendix B
The theoretical model follows the following notation. Three kinds of subscripts are employed, the 
ﬁrst subscript denotes the individual i, the second subscript denotes the crop and the third subscript 
denotes time t. Note that subscript i is implied unless otherwise noted. Subscript “b” refers to Bt 
cotton and subscript “n” refers to non-Bt cotton.
Notation Description
u Per-period utility function
c Per-period consumption
s Per-period non-material satisfaction
θ Lingering social pressure term
δ Discount factor
A Land
x Pesticides
α(q) and βb(q) Parameters of Bt cotton production function distributed F( (q), b(q))Βn(q) Parameter of non-Bt production function 
L(⋅) Learning function
Ni Set of farmers to whom i is connected
Y Production
ε Stochastic component of the production function 
p Price of cotton
px Price of pesticide
Ps Price of seed
Q Probability of a high bollworm pressure year (q_{H})
1-Q Probability of a low bollworm pressure year (q_{L})


About ICRISAT
The International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT) is a non-profit, non-political organization that does 
innovative agricultural research and capacity building for sustainable development with a wide array of partners across the globe. 
ICRISAT’s mission is to help empower 644 million poor people to overcome hunger, poverty and a degraded environment in the dry 
tropics through better agriculture. ICRISAT belongs to the Alliance of Centers of the Consultative Group on International Agricultural 
Research (CGIAR).
Contact Information
www.icrisat.org
ICRISAT-Patancheru
(Headquarters)
Patancheru 502 324
Andhra Pradesh, India
Tel +91 40 30713071
Fax +91 40 30713074
icrisat@cgiar.org
ICRISAT-Liaison Office
CG Centers Block
NASC Complex
Dev Prakash Shastri Marg
New Delhi 110 012, India
Tel  +91 11 32472306 to 08 
Fax  +91 11 25841294
ICRISAT-Nairobi
(Regional hub ESA)
PO Box 39063, Nairobi, Kenya
Tel +254 20 7224550
Fax +254 20 7224001
icrisat-nairobi@cgiar.org
ICRISAT-Niamey
(Regional hub WCA)
BP 12404, Niamey, Niger (Via Paris)
Tel +227 20722529, 20722725
Fax +227 20734329
icrisatsc@cgiar.org
ICRISAT-Bamako
BP 320
Bamako, Mali
Tel +223 20 223375
Fax +223 20 228683
icrisat-w-mali@cgiar.org
ICRISAT-Bulawayo
Matopos Research Station
PO Box 776
Bulawayo, Zimbabwe
Tel +263 83 8311 to 15
Fax +263 83 8253, 8307
icrisatzw@cgiar.org
ICRISAT-Lilongwe
Chitedze Agricultural Research Station
PO Box 1096
Lilongwe, Malawi
Tel +265 1 707297, 071, 067, 057
Fax +265 1 707298
icrisat-malawi@cgiar.org
ICRISAT-Maputo
c/o IIAM, Av. das FPLM No 2698
Caixa Postal 1906
Maputo, Mozambique
Tel +258 21 461657
Fax +258 21 461581
icrisatmoz@panintra.com 
202-2009ISBN 978-92-9066-517-5 RBE 024
